Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1958

Julia T. Alvarez v. Paul Paulus and Stover Bedding
and Manufacturing Co. : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
W. D. Beatie; Attorney for Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Alvarez v. Paulus, No. 8895 (Utah Supreme Court, 1958).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3152

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

.UNIVERSITX .UTAH

DEC 1 91958
IN THE SUPREME COl!RT

flW'HfiRARY:

STATE OF 'OO'AH

JULIA T. ALVAREZ,

Plaintiff and Appellant
vs.

)
)
)
)
)

) Case No.

PAUL PAUIDS and STOVER
BEDDING and MANUFACTURING
COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.

)
)
)
)

8895

)

----tt--F \ L E D
APPELLANT 13 BRIEF

SEP

z 01958

W. D. BEATIE

Attorney for
Appellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX

Page
STATEMEN'T • • • •
COMPLAINT • • •
ANSWER • • • •
PREI'RIAL ORDER

TEE FACTS • •

•

• • • o • • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • • • •

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

0

1
2
3
6

9

•

• 12

POINTS RELIED ON • • • • • • • • • • •
ARGUMENT
POINT 1.

Dr REFUSING TO SUBMIT TEE
THEORY OF APPELLP~T OF
FAILURE TO YIELD RIGHT-OF-WAY AS NEGLIGENCE WHEN PRETRIAL ORDER SET FORTH THIS
MATTER AS ISSUE AND THE
GIVING OF INSTRUCTIONrNo.
7 DIRECTING THAT THERE WAS
NO QUESTION OF RIGHT-OFWAY • • • • • • • • • o •

POINT 2.

m

•

13

SUBMITTrnG QUESTION OF

ACCIDIDIT AS A DEFENSE TO
THE JURY • • • • • • • • •
POllfT 3o

CONCLUSION •

17

IN SUBMITTING THE QUESTION!
OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
OF APPELLANT TO THE JlJRY • • 25

• •

•

•

0

•

•

•

•

•

0

•

•

•

33

CASES CITED

Arna v. Karshner, 168 N.E.237 •

o

•

•

•

21

Barker v. Savas, etal, 52 Uo 262;
17 2 Pa c • 6 7 2 o • • • • • • • •

•

•

.,

30

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Beckstrom v. Williams, 3 u. (2) 310;
282 Pac • ( 2d) 309 • • • • • • • • • •

14

Cheshire v. Na11 1 219 S.W.(2d) 248 • • •

19

Corbett v. Oregon Short Line Ry.co.~
25 u. 449; 71 Pao. 1065 • • • • • • •

25

Flanagan v. Chicago City Ry. Co.$
90 N .E.. 6 88

o

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

21

Hogan v. IQtnsas City Pub. Serv. co.
19 S.W.(2d) 707 1 . 65 A.L.R •. 129 • .. •

~8

Pratt v. Utah Bight & Traction Co.
57 U.. 7 ~ 16 9 Pa c • 86 8 • • • • • • • •

!.3

Riley v. Rapid Transit Co.~
10 U. 428;: 37 Pac. 681 • • • • • • •

29

Texas Coca Cola Bottling Co. v.
Wemberly,, 108 S.W.(2) 860 • • • • •· •

20

Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Hensom
222 s.w. (2) 636 • • • •

"

20

•

24

0

••••

Woodward v. Spring Canyon Coal Co.
90 u. 578 1 63 Pac.(2d) 267 •• o

•

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

m

THE

SUPRE~IIE

COURT

OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

JULIA T. ALVAREZ,

Plaintiff and

)
}
Appell~~t

)
)

vs.

PAUL PAULUS and STOVER:

)
)

)

Case No ..

BEDDING and MANUFACTURING
COMPANY, a corpora tion 1

)

8895

)

)

Defendants and Respondents. )

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a verdict made

and entered in the Court of the Hon. Fo

w.

Keller o,f the Third Judiotal District in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah on the
12th day of April 1 1958 and made final by
the order of said Court overruling the motioru
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tor new trial in said case on the 1st day
of May, 1958.,
The complaint alleges as follows:
"Plaintiff complains of defendants
and for cause of action alleges:
1. That Maria Elena Ontiveros, a
minor, who was killed by the defendants as hereinafter alleged on the
15th day of January, 19581 was the
minor child of the plaintiff and was
a deserted child by the father thereof.
2. That the defendant Paul Paulus
is a resident of Salt Lake Ci ty 1 ~
State of Utah, and the defendant
Stover Bedding and Manufacturing
Company, is a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue
of the laws of the State of ~tah,
having its principal place of business in Salt Lake City, Utah.
3. That on the 15th day of January,.,
1958 at about the hour of 12:57 p.m.,,
the said defendant Paul Paulus was
operating a truck in the course of
his employment and as the ag~t of
the defendant Stover Bedding and
Manufacturing Company, westerly upon1
Emeril Avenue at a point just east
of 216 Emeril Avenue, Salt Lake City,,
Utah, and that the defendants so negligently and carelessly managed and
operated said truck at said time and
place that said truck violently ran
against and over mortally injuring
and killing Maria Elena Ontiveros,
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the minor daughter of said plaintiff, and that by reason of the negligence, carelessness and violence
of the defendants aforesaid and as
a proximate result thereof the said
Maria Elena Ontiveros was struck•
run over, mortally injured and
killed by said defendants at said
time ·and place.
4. That at the time of the killing
and death of said Maria Elena Ontiveros,
the minor daughter of plaintiff,
she was of the age of 22 months;
was unmarried and had no issue; was
strang, healthy and robust and was
a source of great comfort to the
plaintiff. That by reason of the:
death and killing of said Maria
Elena Ontiveros aforesaid, plaintiff has been totally and forever
deprived of the society, comfort,
protection and services of her said
minor daughter 1 all to her damage
in the sum of ~21,000.00. That
plaintiff has been required to pay
the sum of $290.00 for the funeral
and burial expenses and incidents
to the funeral and burial of said
deceased daughter and that plaintiff
has therefore been damaged in the
sum of $290.00 special damages.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment
against the defendants for the sum
of $21 1 000.00 general damages· and
$290.00 special damages and alli
costs incurred herein."

W. D. BEATIE
Attorney for Plaintiff
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The answer of the defendants is as
follows:
l"Come now the defendants and by
way of answer to the plaintiff's
complaint heretofore filed ·in the
above-entitled action, admit, deny,
and a~lege as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE

The Complaint fails to state a
claim against the defendants upon
which relief can be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE

The defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 2 of plaintiff's
complaint; admit that on the 15th
day of January, 19581 at approximately 12:57 P. M. Maria Elena
Ontiveros, met her death in a pedestrial-vehicle accident on Emeril Avenue, at a point East of 216 Emeril
Avenue in Salt Lake City, Utah;
that the vehicle involved in said
accident was a truck owned by the
Stover Bedding and Manufacturing
Company and driven by Paul Paulus,
an employee of the defendant,Stover
Bedding and Manufacturing Company.The defendants specifically deny
that they were careless, negligent,
or violent in the operation of the
said vehicle, and the defendants
deny each and every other allegation contained in plaintiff's complaint not heretofore admdtted.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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THIRD DEFENSE
The defendants affirmatively allege
that the plaintiff was negligent
on the 15th day of January, 19581 ,
at the time of said aociden t which
was the approximate hour of 12:57
P. M., in that she failed to use
that measure of prudence required
by the circumstances in the pro·tection and care of her minor child,
Maria Elena Ontiveros, in that she
allowed her child of the tender
years of 22 months to be unattended
on Emeril Avenue, in Salt Lake City,
Utah, and plaintiff knowing full
well that Emeril Avenue was a thoroughfare frequented by vehicles of
all descriptions, including the defendant's truok., That such negligence on the part of the plaintiff
was the sole and proximate oausa
of the injury and death of Maria
Elena Ontiveros.
WHEREFORE, defendants pray that
plaintiff's complaint be dismissed
and that they have their costs incurred herein."
Dated this 17th day of February,,
1958.,
EMMETT L •. BROWN
Attorney for Defendants
The pretrial order of Han. A· H. Ellett
was as follows::
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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!'The above -entitled rna tter came
regularly before the court for
pretrial on March 26 1 1958. The
parties appeared by counsel as
follows:

w.

For the plaintiff,

D. Beatie.

For the defendants, Emmett Brown.
The following matters are not in
dispute, and no proof will be required to establish them at the
trial of this lawsuit:
1. Plaintiff is the mother of Maria
Elena Ontiveros, a minor child of the
age of twenty-two months at the time
she diedo
2. On the 15th day of January, 19581
Maria Elena Ontiveros lost her life
as a result of being run over by a
truck driven by Paul Paulus 1 who was
the agent of the Stover Bedding and
Manufacturing Company and in the
course of his employment at the time.
3. The reasonable cost of funeral
expenses necessarily incurred in the
burying of Maria Elena Ontiveros
was $188.05.
4. Maria Elena Ontiveros was run
over a few minutes before one o'clock
in the afternoon of January 15 1 1958 1
and the roads were wet but not icy.
It is the contention of plaintiff
-

fl

-
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that
rruite
life
acts
Paul

her child was an illegitichild and that she lost her
by reason of the following
of negligence on the part of
Paulus:

(a} He backed his truck without
keeping a proper lookout for pedestrians along the highway and par-ticularly for Maria Elena Ontiveros.
(b) He backed his truck onto Maria
Elena Ontiveros without giving any
warning or signal that he was backing the truck.
(c) He failed to yield to Maria
Elena Ontiveros the right of way
to which she was entitled.
Plaintiff further contends that as
a result of the negligence of Paul
Paulus, she is entitled to recover
from the defendants and each of them
the funeral expenses incurred in the
burial of her child to~ether with
damages in the sum of @21 1 000.00.
It is the contention of the defendants and each of them that Paul Paulus
was not negligent as claimed by the
plaintiff or at all and that the
death of the child was the result
of an accident. Defendants further
contend that the plaintiff was herself negligent in that she allowed
a twenty-two month old child to be
playing in the street without proper
supervision. The defendants further
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con tend that the plaintiff cannot
maintain this action for the reason
that she is not the proper person
to bring the same.
The court being advised in the matters now finds that there exist the
following:

DISPUTED ISSUES OF FACT
1. Was Paul Paulus negligent as
claimed by the plaintiff?
Was the plaintiff negligent as
claimed by the defendants?

2o

3. Was such negligence, if any, a
proximate cause of the injuries received by Maria Elena Ontiveros?
4. What is the amount of general
damages sustained by Julia T. Alvarez?
5. Was Maria Elena Ontiveros illegitimate?

DISPUTED ISSUES OF LAW
1. Is the plaintiff entitled to
bring this action?

2. Is the plaintiff entitled to recover·
from the defendants?
It is ordered that all pleadings heretofore filed in this action be merged
in this pretrial order, and the only
issues of law or of fact to be heard
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and determined upon the trial hereof are those set forth herein~ except that for good cause shown and·
to prevent manifest injustice this
order may be subsequently amendedo
It is further ordered that this case
be set do~wn for jury trial commenc-ing Friday, April 11, !.958, at ten
o'clock a. m. "
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this
26th day of March, 1958~
A. H. ELLErT
Judge
FACTS
Emeril Avenue where this accident happened is a private right-of-way which

runs~

west from First West Street just north of
the Claudann Apartments which is located at
25 North lst West Street.

This right-of-way

is 20 feet wide and 330 feet long and runs
easterly and westerly.
The defendant Stover Bedding and Manufacturing Company has a warehouse built in
a "U" shape around the west end of Emeri 1
Avenue and the north side of the warehouse
is partially adjacent to the

right-of-way~
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The entrances to the Stover warehouse
are on the north and south side of the
Emeril Avenue portion of the warehouse.
and not adjacent to the right-of-way.
Reference hereafter to record designated (R} and to Exhibits (Ex.).
Plaintiff called as a witness the
defendant Paul Paulus who testified that
he was the driver of the

2i

ton Reo truck

in the course of his employment for the
defendant Stover Bedding and Manufacturing
Company and that he approached Emeril Avenue on the day in question from the north
and made a right-hand turn into Emeril Avenue and proceeded westerly about 3/4 of the
way down the Avenue and turned his truck
into a driveway on the north side designated
as being that area between the houses designated as 226 and 228 Emeril Avenue (Exo 14)
and stopped at point. ( P-1, Ex. 19) (R-49) o
That it was his intention to back the truck to
thA

Stover warehouse for

loadin~

but that he
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could not make the turnaround in the small
driveway in order to back the truck up
because of two automobiles parked in the
south side of Emeril Avenue. {Ex. P-11).
He then drove the truck backwards out of
Emeril Avenue in an easterly direction to
point {P-2), R-50) then to point {P•3l'
(R-51) and (P-4) (R-52) all shown on
(Ex. P-19) 1 where the truck was brought to
a stop then facing in an easterly direction.
He got out of his truck and walked around it,
warned three older children away from the
truck who were standing on the south side
of Emeril Avenue near the Claudann Apartments. {R-63).

He then got in his truck

and honked his horn and proceeded to back
his truck westerly along Emeril Avenue
and claimed at all times to have been
watching to the rear of the truck from
the rear-view mirrors on the right and
- 11 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

left sides of the cab of the truck.

De-

fendant Paulus never observed the twentytwo month old deceased until he had run
over her and she was lying in front of the
truck and he then brought his truck to a
stop at the point in Emeril Avenue as shovvn
by (Ex. P-4) and .Ex •. P-5).

The point where

the body of the child was lying is shown
as Point A (Ex. 5)o
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON. BY
APPELLANT FOR REVERSAL OF JUDGMENT
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR:
POINT l
IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT THE THEORY OF
APPELLANT OF FAILURE TO YIELD RIGHTOF-lNAY AS NIDLIGENCE WHEN PRETRIAL
ORDER SET FORTH THIS MATTER AS ISSUE
AND TEE GIVlliG OF INSTRUCTION NOo 7
DIRECTING THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTIONl
OF RIGHT...OF..WAYo

POINT 2
IN SUBMITTING QUESTION OF ACCIDENT
AS A DEFENSE TO THE JURY.
POINT 3
IN SUBMITTING THE QUESTION: OF

... 12 ...
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CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF APPELLANT TO THE JURY.
ARGUMENT
POlllT 1

IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT THE THEORY OF
APPELLANT OF FAILURE TO YIELD RIGffilOF-WAY AS NIDLIGENCE WHEN PREI'RIAL
ORDER SEr FORTH THIS MATTER AS ISSUE,
AND THE GIVING OF INSTRUCTION NO. 7
DI_RECTING THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION!
OF RIGffi'-QF•WAY.

The law is well established that each
party is entitled to have its full theory
presented to the jury by instructions.
Martineau v. Hansen, 47 Utah 549 1 155 P.
432; Toone v. J. Po O'Neil Const. Co.,

40 Utah 265 1 121 Po 10; Pratt v. Utah Light

& Traction

Co.~

57 Utah

7~

169 Po 868;

Morgan v. Bingham Stage Lines Co., 75 Utah

87 1 283 P. 160; Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah

151, 140 P. (2d) 772; McDonald v. Union Pacific R. Coo 109 U • 493 1 167 P •. ( 2d)
Vo

Madsen 120

u.

6~85;

Startin

631, 237 Po (2d) 834.

In Pratt v. Utah Light & Traction Co.,
supra, the Court statedt
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"'Each party to a suit is entitled
to have his theory, when there is
evidence to sustain it, submitted
to the jury and the judgment of the
jury on the facts tending to support
such theory, ass~ng always that
there is testimony offered to support the same, and this Court has
so held in Hartley v. Salt Lake City~
41 Utah 121~ 124 Pac. 522 1 where,
speaking through Straup,J.,it is said:
'There are two parties to a law suit.
Each,. on, a submission of the case to
the jury, is en titled to a submissionof it on his theory and the law.' in respect thereof. The defendant's theory as.
to the cause of the accident is embodied:
in the proposed requests. There i& some
evidence as we have shown, to render
them applicable to the case. That is
not disputed. We think the court's refusal to charge substantially as requested was error. That the ruling was prejudicial and works a reversal of the judgment is self-evident and unavoidable.'"'
11

In Beckstrom va. Williams, 282 Pac. (2d)
3091 J. Crockett stated at page 310:
"The jury having rejected plaintiff'$
complaint, on appeal,) we would ordinarily view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the defendant. This
is not true, however, in this case
where the plain tiff 's appeal challenges~
the trial court's refusal to submit
plaintiff's theory of the case to tha
jury~ as was his undoubted right if the
evidence would justify reasonable men
in following his theory."'
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Under the testimony of the defendant
Paul Paulus, he first proceeded into Emeril
Avenue to point P-1 (Ex. 19) J, then backed
his truck easterly toward First West to
Point 2 1 (Ex. 19);. then through several
manipulations turned the truck around to
Point 3 (Ex. 19), and finally came to rest
at Point 4, (Ex. 19) at which point he got
out of the truck and walked around the same
before proceeding to back the truck in a
westerly direction into Emeril Avenue.

It

is to be noted that Point 4 1 above referred
to is completely off the right-of-way of
what is called Emeril Avenue, and that the
ultimate destination of the truck was past
the west end and off the right-of-way of
Emeril Avenue and that the defendant Paulus:
was therefore a trespasser on the right-ofway at the time of the accident.

The de-

ceased child had a perfect right as a pedestrian to use the right-of-way and in walking
- 15 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in an easterly direction she traveled a

greater distance from the west end of
the porch of 218 Emeril Avenue than the
truck

tr~eled

from Point 4 to the point

of the accident.

His failure to yield the

right-of-way to the deceased could have
been found by the jury to constitute negligence and this negligence, the proximate,
oause of the death of the deceased.

This

finding could have been made independently
of any statute and if such were the faot,
liability of necessity would have been
established against the defendants in this
caseo

Depriving the plaintiff of this sub-

stantial ground of recovery and a refusal
to instruct the jury as requested by plaintiff's instruction No. 7 1 and the giving of
Instruction No. 7,, which ins truction expressly stated that there was no preference in
the use of the right-of-way as between the
pedestrian and the truck, resulted in thia.
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oase in an injustice and the denial to
the plaintiff to that fair trial to which
she was entitled under the laws of this
State.
POINT 2
IN SUBMITTlllG QUESTION OF ACCIDENT
AS A DEFENSE TO THE JURY.

The pre-trial order of Judge Ellett
stated:
wrt is the contention of the defendants and each of them that
Paul Paulus was not negligent as
claimed by the plaintiff or at al~
and that the death of the child was
the result of an accident." (R.lO)
The defendants submitted an instruction
on accident (R.l71) and the court instructed the jury in instruction No. 6 1
the latter part of which is as follows:.
"The law recognizes that there are
occasions when the operators of
motor vehicles strike and inflict
serious bodily injury or aeath
upon pedestrians under circumstances
where the driver of such vehicle or
the pedestrian or person responsible
for the safety of the pedestrian use
due care. In such cases 1 there is~
no liability in law upon the of the
persons involved." (R.l82)
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It is the contention of appellant that the
wording of this latter part of the instruction is in effect the wording of an instruction on what is called accident or unavoidable
accident, when the issue, as the jury waa
instructed was first, the negligence of the
defendants, and

secondly~

the contributory

negligence of the plaintiff.
In Hogan vs. Kansas City Pub. Serv.
Co. 19 SW (2d) 707 1 65 ALR 129.

The Court

at page 137 of ALR said:
8

It will be noticed that the respondent
assumes an accident instruction is proper if the evidence permits an inference that the parties {participants or·
litigants) were innocent of negligenceo
This is not the law, unless there is
something in the record tending to
show the casualty resulted from an
unknown cause. It is not every true
accident case in which the court may
instruct on. accident. When, as here,
the misadventure resulted from known
actions of known persons and things
the giving of an accident ins true ti on·
is error by the great weight of recent
authority in this State. * * *· The
word accident in popular acceptation·
and sometimes in law may denote an
occurence arising without intent or
design, or even from the carelessness·
of man; but in the law of negligence
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it simplifies an event resulting irr
damage or injury proceeding from
an unknown cause or from a known cause
without human agency or without human
fault.. 1 C.J •. pp 390 et seq;. 20 R.C.L.
pp 17 1 et seqo The essential requirement is that the happening be one to
which human fault does not contributeo
At page 138 and in Wise vs. St. Louis
Transit, supra,:
'There was no evidence in the case'
of any accident or misadventure. The
issue tendered by the pleadings and:
by the evidence was simply whether
the defendant was negligent or not and
the Court was right in not inviting
the jury into a field of conjecture and
speculation. r "
In the case of Cheshire v. Nall, 219

s. w.

(2d) 248.

c.

J. Pitts at 254 said:

"The trial court prepared the charges,
after all the evidence had been heard:
and it was not required to submit
any issues other than those raised,
by the pleadings and the evidence~
The issue of unavoidable accident
exists in such a case and should be
submitted only where there is evidence
that something other than the negligence of at least one of the drivers
caused the injuries complained ofo In
this case the evidence showed conclusively that the collision occurred on
a level paved highway at a slight curve:
with a small incline but nothing to obstruct the view of the driverso There
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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was no evidence of any slippery
highway or obstruction on the highway or any break in the mechanism
of either automobile immediately
before the collision or any otheF
intervening cause of the collision.
In our opinion the evidence raised
no issue of unavoidable accident."

In Western Union Telegraph co. v. Henson,
222

s. w. (2d) 636.
c. J. Pitts at

640 said:

"Appellant attacks the trial court's
judgment in its 2nd point of error because it refused to submit to the jury
the issue of unavoidable accident •· The
rule has been well established that
such an issue exists only when there is
evidence that something other than the
negligence of one of the parties caused
the injury about which complaint is
made.'t
In Texas Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Wemberly,_.

108

s. w. (2d} 860.
c. J. Leslie at

page 863 said:

•rn the case of Magnolia Coca Cola co.
v. Jordan, supra, it is said: 'The
issue of unavoidable accident is not
raised when there is no evidence ·tend-·
ing to prove that the injuries resulted.
from some cause other than the negligence of one of the parties.• Boyle v.
McClure, 24 s. w. 1080. 'There is no
evidence from which it can be reasonably
inferred that the injury of Mrs. Jordan
was caused by any other than her own
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negligence in driving her automobile into a parked automobile or
the negligence of the driver in
plaintiff's in errors truck striking
Mrs. Jordan 1 s automobile.. If the
jury had answered that the in jury
was the result of an unavoidable accident its findings would have been supported by nothing stronger than surmise or suspiciono"
In Flanagan v. Chicago City Ry. Co.,JJ 90

N. E. 688.

J. Vidcus at 689 said:
"Appellant requested an instruction:
that there was no liability for an
unavoidable accident, and that if the_
jury believed, from the evidence,
that, so far as appellant was concerned the accident was unavoidable
they should find the defendant not~
guilty. The court instructed the
jury that the burden of proving negligence of the defendant was on the
plaintiff; that this must govern the
jury in deciding the case and that
if by this rule the plain tiff hadl
failed to establish his case it waa
the duty of the jury to find the defendant not guilty. An unavoidable
accident is one necessarily occuring
not because of negligence. The requirement of proof of negligence therefore eliminates the hypothesis of unavoidable accident and it was not error'
to refuse to give the instructiono"
In Arva v. Karshner, 168 N. E. 237o

Co J. Cushing at 238 said:
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"The court further charged the jury
as follows: 'At the suggestion of
the attorneys for the defendants the
court says to you that if you find
from the evidence that the death of
David Frank Arva was the result of an
unavoidable accident that your verdict
should be for defendant. r This por,...
tion of the charge was erroneous as,
the allegations of both the pe ti ti on and:
answer charged negligence and an unavoidable accident is necessarily an
accident oocuring not because of negligence and is one that happens withoat any apparent cause or without any
fault attributable to anyone. If the:
negligence of defendants was proveru
to have proximately caused the accident and no contributory negligence
was shown, plaintiff would be entitled
to recover. If plaintiff failed to
prove the negligence of defendants,
proximately caused the injury, plaintiff could not recover. In such cases:,
there is no place for the question of
unavoidable aociden t .u
It is respectfully contended that the
issues in this case are the negligence of the
defendant and the contributory negligence of
the plaintiff as submitted to the jury, and,
any issue of unavoidable accident is therefore
eliminated and the giving of the latter portion of this instruction No., 6 is prejudicial
error.
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Further, the latter portion of thia
instruction is not the law wherein the oourt
used in the latter part of said instruction:
uwhere the driver of such vehicle
or the pedestrian or person res.,,..
ponsible for the safety of the
pedestrian use due oare't.
The defendant Paul Paulus well knewv
that there was the hazard of children during the entire movement of his truck at this
particular looa tion as shown by the follow ...
ing testimony of said defendant Paulus:
"~

All right, mark that P-1 will
you? Paulus 1.. P-1.

"Q

Now will you ask Mr. Paulus please
what next did you do with the truck
and indicate the movement of the
same from the point p ...2 to some
other point at whioh you brought
the truck to a stop.

'"A

I left the truck. Looked around as;
there were two cars standing there.
And I took my truck. Children were
playing here. I told the children
to get away because I am ooming out~
Then I drove slowly this directiono
(R • 49)

"Q

Now
the
P-.4
in,.

at the time you started to move
truck, Mr. Paulus, from point
you were interested principally
and only in the three children
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when, which you say, at the south
side of Emeril Avenue, were you not?
11

'A

I watched them constantly •

(R •. 63)

"Q

I am going to ask you, Mr. Paulus,
if there were not some children as;
you were driving baek out of Emeri1
Avenue on this day driving easterly,,
there were not some children at about
225 Emeril Avenue took hold of the
rear of your truck and came up to
the front at about 216 where the
children there dropped off your
truck •. Isn't that a fact?

"A

Children were hanging on the truck
like this. tt

This court has held in Woodward v.
Spring Canyon Coal Co. 90 Utah, 578 1 63
Paco (2d) 267 1 wherein

c.

J. Elias Hansen at

page 587 said:
"It is a matter of common knowledge
that children are prone to be less;
mindful of danger than are persons
of rna ture years. For that reason, a
greater degree of care is required of
a person who drives an automobile in
close proximity to children than is:
required in driving in olose proximity
to mature personso Herald v. Smith,
Supra; Green v. Higbee, 66 Utah 539,,
244 Pac. 906; Blashfield's Cyc. of
Automobile Law and Practice {Perm.Ad.)
Vol. 2, Seco 1492 1 page 519.tt
It is therefore respectfully contended
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~

that the court made no distinction in this

instruction, between that degree of care
necessary to drive

i~

the neighborhood of

mature persons and that greater degree of
oare which is necessary where the driving

.

is in close proximity to chi]dren and the
failure at: the court to: instruct the jury

of that greater degree of care necessary for
the defendant Paul Paulus to exercise in
this particular instance is prejudicial
error.
POmT 3
IN SUBMITTING THE QUESTION OF
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF APPELLANT TO THE JURY.

The principal of law that the burden
does not rest upon the plaintiff to show his
freedon from negligence but upon defendant

to prove contributory negligence unless the
plaintiff's testimony tends to so prove
is well established by the

oases~

it~

Corbett

v. Oregon Short Line Ry. Co. 25 Utah 449,
71 Pao. 1065 •.
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The defendants in this instance did not
adduce any testimony other than by cross examination of plain tiff's witnesses, thus the
testimony of contributory negligence would
have to rely upon statements of plaintiff's
witnesses.
The only evidence of the use of Emeril
Avenue right-of-way for vehicular traffic
is that of the defendant Paul Paulus on direot examination by plaintiff.
"Q

How many times prior to January
1.5 1 1958 would you say that you
had driven a truck for your employer Stover Bedding into Emeril
Avenue and into your employerYs
warehouse at the west end of
Emeril Avenue?

"A

Way mf'ten ..

0

Q

Well ask him what he means by way
ofteno

nA

He drove at least 4, 5 1 6 times a
week ..

"Q

For a four-year period?

"A

No, for about a year since the
fao tory was ereo tedo·

"Q

Will you ask him please if he would
estimate that he has driven into
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Emeril Avenue for his employer
at least 100 times?
"'A

He thinks that is about right,,
yes. "; (R •. 37)

The plaintiff testified that on the
day of this accident she was doing the family
washing and that there were three of the
children home on· that afternoon and that
the three children were on the porch of
plaintiff's residence for the first time
that day when the accident happened; that
while the children were on the porch she observed the truck of the defendant going into
Emeril Avenue and that she again saw the;
truck (R •.ll9) going out towards First West
at which time the children were on the porch
and that she was standing in the doorway at
the time; that she then went to the kitchen
to see her washing and when she returned the
accident had happened; that the children had1
been on the porch that day not to exceed
three minutes and tha. t there was about a
minute and a half between the time she saw
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all three children on the front porch and
the time the accident happened. (R.,l20}
The plain tiff testified

on~

cross ex ..

amination:
"~·

A little bit bigger than the

dis~

tance between the houses. You
have tha. t kind of back yard there.
Now, Mrs. Alvarez, you said that
the children -let's see, there
was the little baby, 22 months old,
and how old were the other two
kiddies out on the porch?
0

A Well,Freddie is six and Lupe is four.

tr:Q

Four and six. Pre-school child•
ren, is that right?

"A

Tha. t 's right •·

"Q

I believe that you said that they,
you always had them play just on
the porch'?

"A

Yes.

"Q

Don't they ever go off this porch?

"A

When I go with them and take care
of them ..

"Q

Just when you walk with them·?

"A

Yeso

"Q

Don 1 t they ever play in the back
yard?

n·A

No.

(R ..l29}
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"Q

How many times a day d1d you
them play on the porch?

"A

Two times a day.

"Q

About two times a day. Do you
have any gateway that stops - did
you have any gateway to stop Maria
from getting off the porch?

"A

No I didn't have a gate.

"Q.

And for how long had you allowed
them to go on the porch twice a
day?

"A

At least two hours, because I -

"'Q

And did they never go off the porch
during those two hour periods
twice a day'?

"A

No •.

"Q

Never did?

"A

No..

(R.l30)

In the case of Riley v. Rapid Transit

Co. 10 Utah 428, 37 Pac. 681.

J. Smith said at page 437:
nThe next assignment upon the insufficiency of the evidence is that
the plaintiff or his agents in charge
of the child were negligent in allowing the child upon the street. The
record is entirely and absolutely
silent upon the sub jeot of the care
of those intrusted with this child •
.. 29 ....
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to show, how the child came into the
street, and it seems to us that it
would be going a long way to hold
that it was negligence per se for
the parents of a child seven years
old to allow him to go upon the public streets.. There is nothing to
show that they knew anything of his
being on the street. The defendant,
in operating its street-car line,
should operate it in such a way as:
to protect the lives of children and
other people, who have an equal right
to the use of the street; and it is.
guilty of culpable negligence if it
fails to exercise ordinary care forthe protection of such children, when
they themselves, or those in charge
of them, have done nothing to unnecessarily expose them to danger. 11
In the case of Barker v. Savas, et al,
52 Utah 262 1 172 Pac. 672 •.

J. Thurman said at page 271:
"We have already shown there was no
evidence of contributory negligence
on the part of the deceased, and that
if such could be attributed to a child
of his age and understanding, there
being no evidence of his negligence,
in view of his death by the accident,
the law presumes that he exercised
reasonable care for his ovm safety.
This assignment of error is inexplicable. Appellant assumes that deceased
came to his death on the road from the
blacksmith shop to his home; that plaintiff 1 having started him on that journey,.
cannot recover for the injury that may
have occurred because in sending a boy
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of his age and discretion ou~ on ~ne
public highway he was guilty of contr·ibutory negligence. This theory
and assumption of appellant do not
reflect the facts as we read the
record. The deceased left the blacksmith shop, after his father had repaired his tricycle, and must have
gone straight home as his father directed, for we find him there a few:
minutes after. He then obtained
permission of his mother to follow,
the boys with the pony down to the:
cemetery, as we have heret~ore shovm.
She carefully watched him to that point,
and saw him turn and start for home.
Certainly there is not a scintilla of
evidence in the record that any negligence of the plaintiff contributed to
the injury complained of. Neither was:
there any negligence on the part of the
mother. If the jury in this case ha&
rendered a special verdict and found
against the plaintiff on the grounds of
contributory negligence of any of the
parties concerned, and the question were
presented to this court for review, we
would feel it our duty to reverse the
cause on that ground alone •"
It is contended that the court committed
prejudicial error in submitting the theory
of contributory negligence of the plaintiff
based upon the evidence adduced in this caseo
The only evidence of vehicular traffic
in the right-of-way is that of the defendant
Jaul Paulus that he had been in Emeril Avenue
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least 100 times and, over a period of

one year, that would average about two
times per week.

The only testimony here

is that the plaintiff on the day of the
accident saw the truck drive into Emeril
Avenue and back out of Emeril Avenue while
the children were still on the porch and
we submit that the only logical conclusion
for plaintiff to have assumed was that the
defendant's truck, when she saw the same
back out of Emeril Avenue, had completero
its mission.
~

The plaintiff certainly could not be

guilty of contributory negligence in failing to see any danger which she had no reasonable cause to apprehend or would be deceived
by appearances calculated to deceive an ordinary prudent person after defendant's truck
had made its exit past the residence of the
plaintiff herein.
It is submitted that under the Riley and
Barker cases hereinbefore set forth, the
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plaintiff, under the circumstances could
not be guilty of contributory negligence
and that the court commdtted prejudicial
error in submitting the question of contributory negligence of the plaintiff to
the jury and denial of plaintiff's motion
to dismiss the counterclaim of contributory
negligence.
CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that
the trial court erred in the matters herein,
set forth.

Respectfully submitted,
W. D. BEATIE

Attorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant
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